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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
eTAH PO\VER & LIGHT COMP ANY, a corporation,
Platn
. t t'ff ,

t

vs.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION )
OF UTAH, et al, and EMPIRE
ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC.,
D ef en dans.
t
a corporation,

Case No.
12042

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Empire Electric Association, Inc., a non-profit
rural electric cooperative, was incorporated in Colorado
in 1939. (R. 311; Ex. 1) At this time it commenced
furnishing electric service to its members in southwestern Colorado. In 1952, Empire began serving areas in
San Juan County, Utah. (R. 313, 314; Exs. 3. 4)

In 1957, Empire amended its Articles of Incorporation in order to serve the public generally; 1.e.,
1

members and non-members. (R. 311; Ex. 1) Empire
presently serves both members and non-members. (R.
47 -49) .Membership is not a condition of receiving
service, but rather each consumer has a choice of becoming a member or merely being a non-member consumer.
( R. 47; Ex. 10) The only difference between a member and a non-member is the member's right to participate at annual meetings. (R. 48)
Empire has continued to expand its service throughout San Juan County, as the public need dictated in
areas not served by any other utilities. (R. 18-24, 97,
100, 102) Empire now furnishes electric power to approximately 150 consumers, including individuals, industrial corporations, County, State and Federal agencies, and other utilities including Utah Power & Light
Company. All of these consumers are in the area certificated to Empire. ( R. 356-362; Ex. 9)
· The distribution lines serving these consumers in
Utah are shown by the solid black line on the system
map. (Ex. 3) The entire system of Empire covering
5, 700 consumers is shown on Exhibit 33.
In 1955, plaintiff, Utah Power & Light Company,
was granted a franchise by San Juan County which
authorized plaintiff
"to construct, maintain and operate in, along,
upon and across the present and future roads,
highways and public places in San J
County
... over which said Board has authority, electric
light and power lines, together with all the neces·
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sary or desirable appurtenances, for the purpose
of transmitting and supplying electricity to said
county ... " ( R. 394; Ex. 27)
In the same year, Utah Power was granted a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, No. 1118, by the
Utah Public Service Commission which authorized it
"to exercise the rights and privileges conferred
by franchise ordinance dated January 13, 1955,
granted by San Juan County, Utah.'' (R. 448)

The Certificate did not grant to plaintiff any described
or exclusive area. In contrast the Certificate awarded
to Empire was exclusive and did cover a definite territory, described by metes and bounds, excluding the
consumers of plaintiff. (R. 449-451)
Since 1955, in the area certificated to Empire, Utah
Power & Light has only served two inhabitants and
one wholesale connection to the City of Monticello.
(R. 26) In fact, one of the inhabitants was connected
as late as 1966. (Findings of Fact, R. 446) (R. 26,
129, 13-25) All other lines constructed by Utah Power
running through this particular area are transmission
lines serving areas and substations beyond and outside
of the subject area. (R. 288, 292-295, 299, 300-303)
Most of Utah Power's investment in San Juan County
is for transmission lines serving areas outside San Juan
County. There is some distribution investment for the
area Certificated to Empire. (Exs. 29, 32)
The Empire system is engineeringly sound, is in
good repair, has ample capacity to serve all present
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and future customers and is well maintained. R. 121
'
124) Empire is financially capable of serving its present
and future customers ( R. 96, 97; Exs. 3, 4, 22) The
Company has an adequate source of power and is in
all respects capable of serving the territory granted
to it. (Exs. 6a, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21) There is a public
need for Empire's service, ( R. 99, 100) and there is
no other utility to serve. (R. 102-104) (R. 446, 447)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION MADE A PROPER FINDING OF FACT ON THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO FULFILL ITS UTILITY OBLIGATION.
Plaintiff argues in its Point I, that without having
the issue properly before it, the Commission, in effect,
"de-certificated" plaintiff. Although the word "de-certification" is more demonstrative than accurate, nevertheless whatever result there may be, certainly came
from a complete evidentiary presentation to this Commission by both parties, pursuant to notice and proper
pleading.
A. THE SUFFICIENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S
UT I L I TY PERFORMANCE 'VAS
RAISED AND FULLY DEVELOPED
BY PLAINTIFF.
4

Plaintiff placed in issue its own performance as
a utility in San Juan County. Empire filed its Applieatio11 for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
awl claimed therein:
1. That it has served and is serving the particularly

described area involved.

2. That there is no other utility serving that area;

and

3. That there is a public need for Empire to serve

electricity to the area, which area was described by
a definite boundary. (R. 404-408)

The published notice ( R. 408) and the notice
mailed to plaintiff, clearly set forth the definite boundaries of the area to be certificated and summarized the
claim of Empire,
"That there was no other utility available or
willing and able to service the area in which it
commenced its operation and is now serving;
and that there is no utility at the present time
serving said area or which will suffer interference or duplication in any way by reason of the
service rendered by Applicant to this area by
reason of the granting of the Certificate sought
herein." (R. 409)
Therefore, with notice of Empire's complete claim
and the area to be certificated, Utah Power filed its
protest wherein it claimed:
1. That it had a county franchise;

That it had a Certificate from the Commission;
3. That it was fully meeting all requirements of a

5

utility thereunder and was serving the 'lrea properly;
l:
4. That there was no need to grant any Certificate

to Empire and that such Certificate would result
in duplication of facilities;

5. That the granting of such a Certificate would be

restrictive to Utah Power and result in a 'substantial loss and damage to Utah Power; and
6. That there was no present or foreseeable future

need for the granting of such a Certificate. (R.
437-439)

Therefore, the factual and legal issues in the case
were clearly joined and the matter went to trial. Em·
pire put on its evidence to sustain the allegations of
the application. (R. 4-248, 304-307; Exs. 1-23, 33) Utah
Power put on its evidence in support of its allegations.
(R. 261-303; Exs. 24-32) Quite obviously the Com·
mission had to make Findings of Fact on these issues,
and just as obviously such Findings were likely to
favor one party over another, and they did. The Com·
mission found the Facts in favor of Empire's Appli·
cation for a Certificate and against Utah Power's alle·
gations in protest thereto, on the very issues raised by
plaintiff. (R. 442-449)
Obviously, Utah Power's claim that under its Cer·
tificate of Convenience and Necessity it had adequately
performed and so there was no need for any other
utilitv to be certificated in the area, was inconsistent
with .Empire's claim that it was serving the area, and
6

there was . need for its service to be certificated since
no other ut lity was serving the area.
Certainly it is not unreasonable for either party
coming into this contested hearing claiming contradicting positions, to anticipate and realize that its claims
may not be sustained. There was full and complete
notice, pleading and trial of the very issues set forth in
plaintiff's Point I. One of the main issues raised by the
protest was whether or not Utah Power under its Certificate was serving the public in the area sought to be
certificated by Empire. The proof clearly showed that
Utah Power was not serving the area. The Commission
so found. ( R. 448)
ll. PLAINTIFF'S UTILITY RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS UNDER ITS CERTIFICATE #1118 ARE CORRECTLY DETERMINED IN THE FINDINGS OF
FACT.
The Commission after having discussed the evidence and made Findings relative to Empire's position
in this hearing (R. 442-448) then passed on to a discussion of and Findings on the evidence submitted by
the plaintiff. Although, plaintiff now apparently argues
that the Commission should not have made Findings on
any of the Exhibits and testimony placed in the record
by plaintiff as protestant, nevertheless, we believe the
comments and Findings of the Commission (R. 448,
H9) concerning Utah Power's position are appropriate,
rrasonable and supported by the evidence.
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The Commission states with reference to the Cer·
tifica te and the franchise
"The Certificate of Utah Power (No. 1118,
issued April 28, 1955) thus limited by these purposes, constitutes no authority to operate as a
public utility throughout the entire County of
San Juan, particularly in areas involving other
electric utility and municipal utilities' operations.
It merely authorizes Utah Power & Light Company to use the County's streets and public ways
for the construction and operation of its utilitv
·
system." ( R. 448)

It is apparent from an examination of Plaintiff's
franchise and its Certificate that the above statement
of the Commission is a statement of an obvious fact.
It would be difficult to state the matter more simply
and clearly. In effect, the Commission is rightly saying
that the franchise and the Certificate do not grant to
plaintiff an exclusive general authority over the entire
County. Such a statement is entirely proper, since plaintiff had argued continually to the contrary. (R. 430432) From the Certificate's limited wording it is plain
that plaintiff merely obtained the certificated right to
use the streets for the placing of its poles and lines as
a utility. There is no general grant of authority by this
Commission to serve vast areas of the County in which
there are no County roads and streets. (R. 448) (R.
394; Exs. 27, 28)
The foregoing Finding is certainly appropriate in
view of the fallowing Finding:
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"Further, it is clear that since 1955, Utah Power
has not performed utility obligations or rendered
utility service in the area sought to be certificated herein except for wholesale service to .Monticello and two inhabitants of the County, to
wit: one whose service was connected in 1966,
just south of l\Ionticello, Utah, and another at
the mine shown as Climax Uranium ('Vilson
Shaft) near the Colorado border. Throughout
the area sought to be certificated herein the only
other lines which Utah Power has constructed
since 1955 are the transmission lines shown in
blue on Exhibit 3 ..." (R. 448)
In other words, since 1955 plaintiff has made no effort
to serve the area to be certificated herein. Thus, the Commission has correctly enunciated in its Findings of Fact
the rights and obligations accruing under the Certificate No. 1118.

C. THE COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY
TO DETERMINE THE PLAINTIFF'S
UTILITY OBLIGATIONS AND SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE.
Plaintiff argues about the Commission language
quoted on page seven of its brief ,that:
" . . . the Commission has now determined in a
proceeding not involving the issue, that such Certificate is not sufficient and plaintiff must obtain additional authority to provide service anywhere in that County ... (and that) the Commission's action in de-certificating plaintiff in
San Juan County, as aforesaid, is erroneous and
unlawful and contrary to Utah law."
9

Such an argument on the part of plaintiff seems
to unreasonably and unnecessarily attempt to reach a
harsh result for itself ,through an unrealistic interpre·
ta tion of the language used by the Commission. Additionally, the argument is wrong as a matter of law and
fact:
1. The evidence is clear and uncontroverted that
since 1955, the plaintiff, in the area certificated to

Empire, has only furnished wholesale power to
the municipal system owned and operated by Monticello ( R. 295) and retail power to two other customers. (R. 299, 300) (Findings of Fact R. 448)
In this circumstance, the Commission is author·
ized to require another Certificate where a utility
has not functioned under one previously granted.
Section 54-4-25, (2), UCA, provides,
"No public utility of a class specified in subsection (I) hereof shall henceforth exercise any
right or privilege under any franchise or permit
hereafter granted, or under any franchise or
permit heretofore granted, but not heretofore
actually exercised or the exercise of which has
been suspended for more than one year, without
first having obtained from the Commission a
Certificate that public convenience and necessity
require the exercise of such right or privilege
"
Also Section 54-7-13, UCA, which has been
cited by plaintiffs, permits the Commission to ex·
ercise its regulatory powers in amending or other·
wise modifying any certificate previously issued.
10

:.?. On Page 11 of its brief, plaintiff also seeks to
bring upon itself this self-imposed penalty by alleging that it is now prevented from serving the
entire San Juan County. Such an argument looks
at the Commission's Findings completely out of
context. Clearly the Commission's Findings are to
be considered in terms of the area in question. The
Commission found the following:

a. "The Cerftificate of Utah Power (No. 1118,
issued April 28, 1955) thus, limited by these
purposes, constitutes no authority to operate as
a public utility throughout the entire County of
San .Juan, particularly in areas involving other
electric utility and municipal utility's operations
... " (italics added) ( R. 448)
b. "Further, it is clear that since 1955 Utah
Power has not performed utility obligations or
rendered utility service in the area sought to be
certificated ..." (italics added) ( R. 448)
c. "Throughout the area sought to be certificated
herein the only other lines which Utah Power
has constructed since 1955 are the transmission
lines shown in blue on Exhibit 3. . . . " (italics
added) (R. 448-449)

d. "If protestant, Utah Power, now seeks to
serve San Juan County after having failed to
serve it at lea.Yt in the portions for which Empire
seeks certification, it cannot assume such a position unless Utah Power obtains from this Commission a certificate indicating that the public
convenience and necessity warrants a granting
of this additional authority ... " (italics added)
(R. 449)
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e. "Obviously, therefore, protestant's position
at least in so far as the area of San Juan County
here sought to be certificated to Empire is con.
cerned, has no validity ... " (italics added) (R.
448)

The above Findings obviously are to be taken in
the context written. That is, they relate to the
question of service, or lack thereof, in the area to
be certificated. Portions of sentences should not
be extracted as plaintiff has attempted to do, in
order to attempt to make reversible error affecting
Empire and its certificated area.
3. Finally, but, in no way of less importance is

the fact that this Commission made no Order what·
soever requiring Utah Power & Light to come
before this Commission in order to serve other portions of San Juan County. The Conclusions of
Law and the Order of the Commission relate corn·
pletely to Empire's Certificate and to the rights
and obligations of Empire thereunder. Assuming
arguendo that the status of plaintiff's Certificate
and its performance thereunder were beyond consideration of this Commission in this hearing, then
such statements concerning such matters are more
in the form of dicta. Without authority of a proper
Order of this Commission, they would not have the
serious consequence which plaintiff is striving for
in this Appeal.
Finally, under Point I, plaintiff cites the rule and
authorities on Pages 10, 11 and 12 to the effect that
12

before any established right of a certificated utility
can be amended, there must be a showing that the
utility is unable or unwilling to meet its utility obligation, or that the existing service is otherwise inadequate.
This Commission in its Findings of Fact, Report and
Order has met the requirements of this "well-defined"
rule and made the appropriate Findings. Yet, plaintiff throughout the brief objects to Findings by this
Commission and claims that the Commission should
not make such Findings. Plaintiff might better consider
the rule and the cases cited thereunder as supporting
the Commission's Findings, Report and Order in this
case. For example, plaintiff cites W. S. Hatch Co. v.
Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., 3 Utah 2d
7, 277 P2d 809 ( 1954), for the proposition that the
interpretation of a Certificate presents a question of
law only. That may be true. However, the Hatch case
further indicates that the extent of the authority of
any utility is found within the wording of the Certificate itself. Since there is no uncertainty in plaintiff's
certificate there is no need for interpretation. Rather,
this Commission under its regulatory authority has determined what it wants done in the interest of public
convenience and necessity. This Supreme Court recently in Reaveley vs. Public Service Commission, 20
Utah 2d 237, 436 P. 2d 797, quite clearly reaffirmed
the principle that administrative bodies such as the
Public Service Commission, continue to regulate and
are not bound by any principle of stare decisis. The
Court said,
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"Certainly an administrative agency which has
a duty to protect the public interest ought not
be precluded from improving its collective mind
should it find that a prior decision is not now in
accordance with its present idea of what the public interest requires. This does not necessarily
mean that we think the defendant Commission
has changed its mind in this case."
Our Commission in the subject case has determined
that in the interest of public convenience and necessity
Empire should serve the area in question. It has further
determined that Utah Power & Light Company has
not adequately served the area and, at least in the Findings of Fact, has stated that Utah Power & Light
should come before this Commission in the event that
it seeks to serve additional customers. Such determination is neither an interpretation of the old original
Certificate, an attack against it, nor a deprivation of
the rights thereunder. See Town of Fountain v. Public
Utilities Commission, 447 P.2d 527, (Colo. 1968) The
evidence of failure to serve the area certainly justifies
any position which this Commission may take in the
interest of protecting the public. There is no concept
of law, statutory or otherwise, which supports plaintiff's position that once a certificate is granted, said
utility need never come before the Commission again.
Yet this extreme position seems to be the one taken
by plaintiff in this Appeal.

14

POINT II
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT BEEN DEPRIVED
OF ANY RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.

Plaintiff's Point II is incorrect in two respects:
I. The plaintiff has not been deprived of any valuable property right; and

2. No due process of law has been violated.

A. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT BEEN DEPRIVED OF A VALUABLE PROPERTY RIGHT
'Vhether or not a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity is a valuable property right, as is so strongly
urged by plaintiff, is beside the point. It is clear that
any Certificate of Convenience and Necessity has implicit in it regulation by our Public Service Commission. Our Supreme Court in Union Pacific Railroad
Company, et al, vs. Public Service Commission, 103
Utah 459, very clearly enunciated this rather fundamental principle. The Court stated,
"The discretionary power granted the Commission by the act, to grant or withhold certificates,
negatives the idea that it was intended to grant
and maintain a monopoly in any field. The fact
that the act provides that the Commission may
grant a certificate when it determines that public
convenience and necessity requires such services
recognizes that regulated competition is as much
within the provisions of the act as is regulated
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monopoly. In the exercise of its powers to grant
or withhold certificate of convenience and necessity, questions of impairment of vested or property rights cannot very well arise. No one can
have a vested right to be free from competition,
to have a monopoly against the public. And, unless some justifiable question arises, unless some
point is judicially present, this Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of an administrative tribunal, charged by law with carrying
out matters of non-judicial character."
Each Certificate of Convenience and Necessity is
therefore, impregnated with the concept that it must
be for the public convenience and necessity. This public
convenience and necessity is the sacred charge of the
Public Service Commission. To preserve the public
convenience and necessity this Commission has the right
to grant, amend, alter, modify any and all certificates
and has the continuing regulatory power and duty in
connection therewith. See Reaveley vs. Public Service
Commission, supra.
It is difficult, therefore, to determine just what
"property right" has been taken away from plaintiff.
The above decision of the Utah Supreme Court puts
at rest the concept of these "vested property rights".
notwithstanding plaintiff's citation of various Colorado
cases, which appear to be to the contrary. And an
examination of the Colorado cases, however, shows
that the utilities involved enjoyed exclusive territories
circumscribed by definite boundaries. This is not our
case with plaintiff.

16

The Colorado cases cited by plaintiff, however, do
not help in this case for two reasons:
1. The State of Colorado seems to be dedicated

to the concept of the "regulated monopoly", which
concept is discussed in almost all of the cases cited
by plaintiff; and
:l. The utilities with prior certificates enjoyed ex-

clusive and definitely described areas which were
thereupon reduced. The cases also are materially
distinguishable on their facts. The distinguishing
features are discussed below.
The 1'-lountain View Electric case cited at Page 14
of plaintiff's brief involved a situation where the most
recently certificated area inadvertently and without
knowledge of anyone included a five acre tract which
previously had been certificated exclusively to the City
of Colorado Springs. The Court upheld the prior certificate because the accidental taking was without due
process. Significantly, however, the Supreme Court did
imply a different result had it not been for the fact that
"The decision of the Commission does not contain any language that could be construed to
be a Finding of Fact that Colorado Springs had
abandoned or through its activity or non-activity
created a basis for the taking away of any portion of its Certificate."
The Grand Valley case cited at Page 16 merely
inrnlved the interpretation of rather specific language
found in the Certificate in question. The Court did
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hold, however, that the Commission was the proper
authority to interpret the application of its own Certificate.
In several of plaintiff's cases, including the Grand
Valley case, Western Colorado Power vs. Public Utility
Commi,ssion, 428 P. 2d 922, (Colo.) is cited. This case
however, involves an exclusive area certificate and held
"Therefore, to the extent that the PUC Order
superseded any previous certificates expressly
granting Western the exclusive right to serve in
specifically described areas, the Order was invalid and must be vacated."
It is significant that the Western case did not involve
any question of inadequacy of service.
The Trico Electric Cooperative case cited at Page
17 of plaintiff's brief involved a consolidated hearing
at which each of the opposing parties merely petitioned
the Commission to define by a metes and bounds de·
scription the areas which the Commission had previously
awarded to each utility. The Commission, contrary to
the petitions of both parties changed the areas and
awarded a portion of one utility's area to the other ,
utility. The Supreme Court held that neither party
had gone into the hearing with any notice that the areas
would be modified.
Plaintiff's reliance upon Public Service Compan,11
of Colorado vs. Public Utilities Commission, which
plaintiff calls the "Union case" can only be considered
an attempt on the part of plaintiff to reargue and re·
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assert the traditional investor-owned utilities' opposition to the small rural electric cooperative. The "Union
Case' was decided before the passage of the Colorado
statute bringing cooperatives public utility status, and
is outdated and old by any standards of the Colorado
cases and statutes. It is, of course, particularly inapplicable in Utah because of the amendments to the
Utah statute enacted in 1965, wherein the rural electric
cooperatives were brought under regulation of the Utah
Public Service Commission as public utilities. See
Section 54-4-25, UCA, as amended.
The Home-Light and Power Company case cited
on Page 19 of plaintiff's brief again is of little help here
since the only portion quoted by plaintiff involves a
certificated area wherein the prior certificated utility
was granted an exclusive area described in metes and
bounds. Again the Colorado Court reaffirms the doctrine of regulated monopoly. It is well to point out that
the Home-Light case involves a myriad of conflicting
certificate situations, causing the Colorado Supreme,
Court to attempt to set up some ground rules, quite
irrelevant to our case.
Plaintiff indicates that the extent of its property
right, which it apparently claims has been taken away,
bears some relationship to a total investment of approximately $2,900,000. An examination of the evidence and particularly the testimony of Mr. Boehmer
and .Mr. Shill (R. 286-290, 293-298, 299, 301, 302)
indicates that said extensive investment for San Juan
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County is actually limited to the substation for Monticello and approximately 17 miles of distribution line
to serve the two customers. All other investments are
to transmit power to areas outside of San Juan County
or to other remote portions of the County quite unrelated to the area in question.
Finally, it is clear that nothing has been taken away
under this Commission's order. The plaintiff's service
in the area to be certificated remains as an exception
to the Certificate granted to Empire. There is no evidence of present or prospective service in any of the
other portions of the County being eliminated and
no order or other testimony to indicate that plaintiff
is not able to serve. Any lines which have been built
for future loans involve areas beyond the certificated
area. ( R. 299) The Order of the Commission in no
way deletes any of the area. The Finding of Fact in·
stead suggests and reaffirms the statutory requirement,
based upon regulatory authority of the Commission,
that plaintiff must, in the interest of public conveni·
ence and necessity come to the Commission for further
approval if plaintiff desires to once again assume its
utility obligations by serving additional customers.

B. NO DUE

PROCESS OF
BEEN VIOLATED.

LA 'V

HAS

The Colorado cases cited by plaintiff involve rather
clear instances of surprise, failure to plead or submit
e>idence, or clear inYasions of legally described exclu·
20

sive area certificates without proper notice. In our
case, however, as we have previously set forth in Point
I above, the very issues involving the right to serve
certain areas, the sufficiency of service in these areas
as well as the status of plaintiff's franchise were all
raised in the pleadings, well supported by conflicting
evidence on the part of both parties and were subjected
to extensive argument during the hearing ( R. 249-260,
:!64-266) and in the briefs submitted by the parties.
(R. 412-435)
The question involving alleged vested rights has,
however, been resolved by our Utah Supreme Court
in the Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Public Service Commission case, supra. Additionally, in as much as
plaintiff has cited and relied on various Colorado cases,
inapplicable as they may have been, we should examine
the most recent Colorado Supreme Court case which
is more nearly in point than are any of the plaintiff's
cases. Plaintiff did not mention this case.

In Town of Fountain vs. Public Utilities Commission, 447 P .2d 527 (Colo. 1968) the Supreme Court discussed the due process problem as it related to the Colorado regulated monopoly concept. In that case, the facts
were substantially the same as are the facts here. The
Town of Fountain enjoyed an area certificate covering
a substantial territory but during the last twenty years
had failed to serve more than a relatively small portion
thereof ..Mountain View Electric, a rural electric cooperatiYe, filed an Application for a Certificate cover-

21

ing an area which it was serving, which area included a
majority of the area previously certificated to the Town
of Fountain. After extensive hearing and evidence adduced on both sides, the Public Service Commission
awarded the area to Mountain View. The Town of
Fountain appealed assigning as error that due process
was not satisfied in the situation where its previously
certificated area was reduced in this type of an Application hearing. The Supreme Court, however, held that
due process was satisfied where the area was reduced,
if there was substantial evidence in the record to support a Finding that the certificated utility was unable
or unwilling to serve its certificated area and that pub- 1
lie convenience and necessity required the change. The
facts to support the above findings were simply that
the Town of Fountain had not served the area, and the
Mountain View Electric Cooperative had gradually
expanded into and served the area at the request of
consumers and members needing service. The Court '
also held in that case that its decision was in no way to
be considered an attack on the prior certificate granted
to the Town of Fountain. Plaintiff in our case has ar·
gued that the prior certificate was being attacked by .
the Commission.
On Page 22, plaintiff claims that the certificate
granted to Empire does not serve public convenience
and necessity, but on the contrary obstructs it. This
point is raised for the first time on appeal, not having
been set forth in plaintiff's petition for rehearing and
reconsideration. It is, therefore, barred under Section
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j4-7-15. Furthermore, the Findings of Fact relative

to public convenience and necessity are final and will
not be disturbed by this Court. See Section 54-7-16.
See Salt Lake Transfer Company vs. Public Service
Commission, 11 Utah 2d, 121, 35 P.2d 706, and Lewis
vs. Wycoff Company, Inc., 18 Utah 2d, 255, 420 P.2d
264.

1

The Certificate granted to Empire in this case is
not a certificate such as Utah Power & Light obtained
in Certificate No. 1118 merely authorizing the exercise
of the rights and privileges conferred by the San Juan
County Ordinance. Rather, the Certificate grants Empire the rights to operate as a public utility in a definitely described territory of San Juan County. This
service, however, will be subject to the terms, provisions and conditions of the franchise. There are other
areas in San Juan County over which the County would
have no control; there are areas in which Federal lands
are involved; and, of course, at the present time the
Commission has determined in accordance with Section
54-4-25 that the ordinance granted by San Juan is
sufficient. If at some future date the ordinance becomes
insufficient, then the regulatory procedures open to
the Commission could very well remedy the problem.
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SUMMARY
Plaintiff has not been deprived of any prior certificated rights in San Juan County. It has failed over
the years since 1955 to serve the County as a public
utility should serve. Over this period of time it has
watched the development of Empire Electric and the
expansion of the Empire system to serve the portions
of the County which plaintiff apparently has had no
desire to serve. Plaintiff was not granted an exclusive
right to hold the entire County regardless of its failure
to adequately serve. Instead, plaintiff was merely grant·
ed a Certificate to do the things which San Juan County 1
permitted it to do, to wit: to use the public ways, much
as a right-of-way for the construction and installatiou
of its poles and lines. Public Convenience and Necessity '
does not permit a utility to pick and choose its custo·
mers. Plaintiff has chosen the wholesale customer of
Monticello, a uranium mine and a customer practically ·
under plaintiff's transmission line. All other customers
have been ignored.
The Commission has clearly and necessarily stated
to plaintiff that plaintiff has failed in its utility obliga· ·
tions. Plaintiff now cannot avail itself of its own dere·
liction by searching out a phrase uttered by this Com·
mission, taking it out of context, and attempting !11
embelish it and give it status as an Order of the Com·
mission "de-certificating" plaintiff-all in order to try
to establish some basis for reversal.
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Defendants respectfully urge that the Commission's Findings of Fact, Report and Order be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT of
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
H. WRIGHT VOLKER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Defendants

By -----·························-····-································-··
Elliott Lee Pratt
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